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Abstract—In machine learning, boosting is one of the most popular methods that designed to combine multiple base learners to a
superior one. The well-known Boosted Decision Tree classifier, has been widely adopted in many areas. In the big data era, the data
held by individual and entities, like personal images, browsing history and census information, are more likely to contain sensitive
information. The privacy concern raises when such data leaves the hand of the owners and be further explored or mined. Such privacy
issue demands that the machine learning algorithm should be privacy aware. Recently, Local Differential Privacy is proposed as an
effective privacy protection approach, which offers a strong guarantee to the data owners, as the data is perturbed before any further
usage, and the true values never leave the hands of the owners. Thus the machine learning algorithm with the private data instances is
of great value and importance. In this paper, we are interested in developing the privacy-preserving boosting algorithm that a data user
is allowed to build a classifier without knowing or deriving the exact value of each data samples. Our experiments demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed boosting algorithm and the high utility of the learned classifiers.
Index Terms—Local Differential Privacy, Machine Learning, Boosting
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1 INTRODUCTION
IN machine learning, ensemble learning [5] refers to thestrategy of combining multiple hypotheses to form a
better one. The superior performance over a single base
learning algorithm often leads to a better prediction. Many
works have been conducted under the area and there are
three conventional methods, the bagging [6], boosting [7],
[8] and stacking [9]. Among all three, the boosting method
focuses on training a set of base learners sequentially and
assigning each base learner a weight, then the final decision
is made by a weighted majority voting over all base learners.
As an example, the Boosted Decision Tree (BDT) is of great
popular and widely adopted in many different applications,
like text mining [10], geographical classification [11] and
finance [12]. Like other machine learning algorithm, the
boosting algorithm is developed under the assumption of
a centralized fashion, where all data has been collected
together. However, in the big data era, the data is generated
and stored more sparsely than before, which brings new
challenges and difficulties for such algorithm, for instance,
privacy protection is one of the most emerging demands in
current society.
Data explosion results in tons of data are generated and
held by the individual and entities, such as the personal
image, financial records and census data. The privacy con-
cern raises when the data leaves the hands of data owners
and participates in some computations. The AOL search
engine log [13] and Netflix prize contest [14] attacks prove
such threat and show the needs that machine learning algo-
rithms should be privacy aware. As a promising solution,
Differential Privacy [15] gives a definition of the privacy
and how it can be protected. A mechanism is said to be
differentially private if the computation result of the data
is robust to any change of any individual sample. And
several differentially private machine learning algorithms
[16] has been developed since then. A trusted third party is
originally introduced to gather data from individual owners
and is responsible to process the data privately. Recently,
Local Differential Privacy (LDP) [17], [18] takes the concept
into a local setting and a mechanism is defined to be
local differentially private if the processing makes any two
samples indistinguishable. An advantage with LDP is that it
allows the data owners to perturb the input by themselves
and the true values never leave the hands of the data owner.
Thus unlike DP, there is no need of trusted third party
anymore.
The indistinguishability of any two data samples brings
a strong privacy guarantee for the data owners, and relieve
the fear of information leakage. Thus developing the ma-
chine learning algorithm over such “private” data samples
is of great value and importance. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there is little work about developing the boosting
algorithm with the protection of LDP. In this paper, we are
eager to fill such gap by developing a privacy-preserving
boosting algorithm that satisfies LDP. More specifically, we
consider such a problem: there are two types of parties,
multiple data owners and a data user. Each data owner
holds a set of training samples; the data user intends to fit
a boosted classifier (e.g., BDT) with the samples from data
owners. During the computation, the data owner perturbs
their data using the mechanism that satisfies LDP and only
pass such perturbed data to the data user. In the end, the
data user should only learn the classifier without knowing
or deriving the value of any individual sample from the
classifier, thus the privacy of the data samples are protected.
In the meanwhile, the randomized perturbation mecha-
nism brings noise into the training samples and the mech-
anism is said to satisfy -LDP ( > 0), where the smaller 
is, the more privacy preserved and the more noise injected.
To maintain the utility of the learned classifier, we rely on
the statistical information of the perturbed samples (e.g.,
mean estimation), in which the adopted randomized mech-
anism provides an asymptotically optimal error bound. To
demonstrate, we compare the utility of the learned classifier
in terms of prediction capacity given different existing ran-
domized mechanisms and show that the model learned by
our algorithm effectively maintain a high utility.
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2Furthermore, beyond the widely adopted BDT classifier,
the proposed boosting algorithm is capable to support other
types of classifiers, as the original design of the boosting
procedure. Thus we study other types of classifiers and ana-
lyze the strategies to support such classifiers in our boosting
algorithm. In the experiment, three types of boosted classi-
fiers are implemented and the performance of the classifiers
are evaluated.
Overall, the contributions of our work are three folds:
• We propose a privacy-preserving boosting algorithm,
and implement the widely adopted Boosted Decision
Tree classifier. To the best of our knowledge, there
are few works investigating the privacy-preserving
boosting mechanism with LDP protection and we
provide a comprehensive study in this paper.
• To maintain the utility, the learned classifier is built
over the statistical information of the perturbed train-
ing samples, which results in an asymptotically op-
timal error bound. To demonstrate that, we compare
multiple existing perturbation methods that satisfy
−LDP and show the superior performance of our
method with both real and synthetic datasets.
• Beyond the BDT, we also analyze how to sup-
port other classifiers with our boosting algorithm
and summarize the type of data for corresponding
classifiers, for instance, the Logistic Regression and
Nearest Centroid Classifier. In the experiment, both
boosted classifiers are also implemented and the
utility of them are evaluated comprehensively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. The prelim-
inary is in Section II. The problem definition and proposed
solution are introduced in Section III. The experimental eval-
uation is given in Section IV. The related work is presented
in Section V. Section VI provides the conclusion.
TABLE 1: Notations and Symbols
(Xl, Y l) the dataset held by data owner l
(xi
l, yli) the ith sample and label held by data owner l
xi,j the value of the ith sample of the jth feature
x′i the perturbed output of xi
N l number of sample held by data owner l
L the number of data owners
K number of classes in the dataset
d dimensionality of the dataset
Pr[·] probability of an event
L() loss function
M number of base classifiers in the boosting algorithm
T lm the mth base classifier fitted by data owner l
wi weights of the ith samples
Sj the cross table of the jth feature
-DP -differential privacy
-LDP -local differential privacy
LR logistic regression
DT decision tree
BDT boosted decision tree
NCC nearest centroid classifier
MSE mean squared error
2 PRELIMINARY
2.1 Differential Privacy
Differential Privacy (DP) attracts lots of attention in the
privacy research community in the last decades, which
provides a measurement of the information leakage of in-
dividual sample from the computation over an underlying
dataset. Originally, DP considers the setting that a trusted
data curator gathers data from multiple data owners and
performs a computation from the data, like learn the mean
value or find the maximum/minimum value. To ensure no
one can reliably infer any individual sample from the com-
putation result, the curator adds random noise to the result
such that the released one would not change if any sample
of the underlying data changes. Since no single sample can
significantly affect the distribution, adversaries cannot infer
the information corresponding to any individual sample
confidently. Formally, given two data databases A,A∗, it is
said that A,A∗ are neighbors if they differ on at most one
row. The definition of a (, δ)-differential private mechanism
over A is defined below:
Definition 1 (, δ)-Differential Privacy [15], [23]: A ran-
domized mechanism F is (, δ)-differentially private if for
every two neighboring databases A,A∗ and for any O ⊆
Range(F),
Pr[F(A) ∈ O] ≤ ePr[F(A∗) ∈ O] + δ (1)
where Pr[·] denotes the probability of an event,
Range(F) denotes the set of all possible outputs of the
algorithm F . The smaller , δ are, the closer Pr[F(A) ∈ O]
and Pr[F(A∗) ∈ O] are, and the stronger privacy protection
gains. When δ = 0, the mechanism F satisfies -DP, which
is a stronger privacy guarantee than (, δ)-DP with δ > 0.
2.2 Local Differential Privacy
Similar to DP, a setting of local privacy is investigated by
Duchi et al. [17], namely Local Differential Privacy (LDP),
which provides the plausible deniability to the data owner.
LDP shifts the perturbation from the central site to the local
data owner. It considers a scenario that there is no trusted
third party, and an untrustworthy data curator needs to
collect data from data owners and perform certain com-
putations. The data owners are still willing to contribute
their data, but the privacy of the data must be enforced. The
formal definition is given below:
Definition 2 -Local Differential Privacy [17], [18]: A ran-
domized mechanism G satisfies -LDP if for any input v1
and v2 and for any O ⊆ Range(G):
Pr[G(v1) ∈ O] ≤ ePr[G(v2) ∈ O] (2)
Comparing to DP, LDP provides another solution for
the data owners. Instead of submitting the true values, the
data owners perturb the true data with the mechanism that
satisfies -LDP and then release the perturbed ones. Thus
LDP gives a stronger privacy protection, as the curator only
sees the perturbed data and the true values of the data never
leave the data owners’ hands.
2.3 AdaBoosting
Boosting [7] is a widely used ensemble algorithm to reduce
the bias and variance in supervised learning. Many boosting
algorithms consist of constructing a classifier in an incre-
mental fashion by adding weak classifiers to a pool, and
using their weighted “vote” to determine the final classifi-
cation. Usually, the weak classifier is also referred as a base
3classifier, the term “weak” means the classifier may have
limited predication capacity, for example, the prediction re-
sult is slightly better than random guess. For consistency, we
use base classifier in this paper, rather than weak classifier.
AdaBoost [8] is one of the best learning methods developed
in the last two decades. In the algorithm, each base classifier
is weighted based on its prediction capacity. Initially, all
samples share the same equal weight. After a base classifier
is added, the sample weights are readjusted such that the
misclassified samples gain a higher weights and samples
that are classified correctly lose weights. Thus, subsequent
base classifiers focus more on the samples that were pre-
viously misclassified. And it has been proven [8] that the
final model can converge to a strong learner. Given a multi-
class classification problem, where there are a set of training
data (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn), xi ∈ Rd and yi ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}
is the corresponding class label, the goal is to build a meta-
classifier T (·) from the training data, which consists of a set
of weighted base classifiers. The pseudo code of the SAMME
[24] algorithm is presented in Alg. 1:
Algorithm 1 Stagewise Additive Modeling using a Multi-
class Exponential loss function (SAMME)
1: Input: {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}.
2: Initialize the observation weights wi = 1/n, i =
1, 2, . . . , n
3: for m=1 to M: do
4: Fit a classifier Tm(·) to the training data using weights
wi
5: Compute errm =
∑n
i=1 wiI(yi 6=Tm(xi))∑n
i=1 wi
6: Compute αm = log 1−errmerrm + log(K − 1)
7: Set wi ← wi ·exp(αm · I(yi 6= Tm(xi))), i = 1, 2, . . . , n
8: Re-normalize wi
9: end for
10: return {(α1, T1(·)), . . . , (αm, Tm(·))}
With the return of Alg. 1, given a testing data xt, a class
label yˆt ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} is assigned by argmaxk
∑M
m=1 αm ·
I(Tm(xt) = k).
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION AND PROPOSED SOLU-
TION
3.1 Problem Definition
In this paper, we are interested in developing a privacy-
preserving boosting algorithm, As Fig.1 shows, we consider
the following problem: Given L data owners, each data owner l
holds a set of samples (X l, Y l), xli ∈ Rd, and yli ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}
is the label associates with xli, i = 1, 2, . . . , N
l; the untrust-
worthy data user would like to fit a boosted classifier with
(X l, Y l), l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}. Note in the paper, we assume that
the data possessed by the data owner is represented as numerical
values; for the categorical attribute that with k distinct values, it
can be transformed to k binary attributes using one-hot encoding
and then be proceeded accordingly. The privacy constraint
comes in two-folds at the data owner side, firstly, the data
owner is not willing to share the value of individual sample
to the data user; secondly, any inference of the individual
data sample should be prevented from the intermediate
communication messages. The symbols and notations used
in this paper are summarized in Table. 1.
(X1,Y1)
(X2,Y2) 
Data Owner 1
Data Owner 2
Data Owner L
(XL,YL) 
Data User
d 
Fig. 1: Problem Overview. Data owner l holds a set of
samples (X l, Y l), xli ∈ Rd, and yli ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} is the
label associates with xli, i = 1, 2, . . . , N
l ; the untrustworthy
data user would like to fit a boosted classifier with training
samples from all L data owners. The privacy of xli should
be protected against the untrustworthy data user.
3.2 Threat Model
In the problem, we assume that the data user is untrustwor-
thy and the data owners are honest-but-curious, in which
every data owner is obliged to follow the protocol, but
intentionally likes to extend their knowledge during the
execution of the protocol. And the value of the individual
sample is what each party intends to acquire beyond the final
classifier. Thus an adversary could be either the data user,
a participating data owner or an outside attacker, who
intends to learn the value of data instances possessed by
any data owner. It assumes that adversaries might have
arbitrary background knowledge and there might be a col-
lusion among them. The goal is to enforce the privacy of
individual data instance while maintain the utility of the
learned classifier. Furthermore, the untrustworthy data user
could behave dishonestly, which would not compromise
data owner’s privacy with our solution, but will hurt the
utility of the learned classifier. Therefore, it is of the data
user’s interest to correctly execute the algorithm. As such,
our solution protects the privacy of the data instance from
each data owner. Since the data owner is assumed to be
honest-but-curious, data pollution attacks (e.g., data owners
maliciously modify their inputs to bias the classifier learned
by the data user) are beyond the scope of this paper.
3.3 Privacy-Preserving Boosting
We first provide an overview of our privacy-preserving
boosting algorithm, which is run by the data owner and data
user cooperatively. Recall that boosting algorithm is design
to combine multiple base classifiers into a strong one, and
each base classifier is trained by the samples with readjusted
weights. Our proposed algorithm follows the same idea,
while intends to prevent the leakage of the true value of
individual training sample at the data owner. In general,
the pseudo-code of the algorithm is given in Alg. 2:
4Algorithm 2 Privacy-Preserving AdaBoosting
1: Input: {(X1, Y 1), (X2, Y 2), . . . , (XL, Y L)}.
2: for l=1 to L: do
3: Initialize the observation weights wli = 1/N
l, i =
1, 2, . . . , N l
4: end for
5: for m=1 to M: do
6: for l=1 to L: do
7: Data owner l prepares the local share U l and per-
turbs the local share to get U l
′
.
8: end for
9: Data user randomly selects a group of data owners,
denoted as H and collects the perturbed local share
10: Tm ← Aggregate(U1′ , . . . , UH′).
11: WeightedError ← SecureSum(∑N1i=1 w1i I(y1i 6=
Tm(x
1
i )), . . . ,
∑NL
i=1 w
L
i I(yLi 6= Tm(xLi ))
12: WeightsSum← SecureSum(∑N1i=1 w1i , . . . ,∑NLi=1 wLi )
13: errm ← WeightedErrorWeightsSum
14: αm ← log 1−errmerrm + log(K − 1)
15: for l=1 to L: do
16: wli ← wli ·exp(αm ·I(yli 6= Tm(xli))), i = 1, 2, . . . , N l
17: end for
18: WeightsSum← SecureSum(∑N1i=1 w1i , . . . ,∑NLi=1 wLi
19: for l=1 to L: do
20: wli ← w
l
i
WeightsSum
21: end for
22: end for
23: return {(α1, T1(·)), . . . , (αm, Tm(·))}
The whole algorithm consists of three stages: 1), line 6-
8, each data owner prepares a local share and perturb it
accordingly, the representation of the local share is different
according to the type of the base classifier, and it will be
further demonstrated in later section; 2), line 9-10, data
owner sends the perturbed local share to the data user, and
data user aggregates each to obtain the base classifier for the
current round, then the base classifier is sent back to each
data owner; 3), line 11-21, each data owner computes the
weighted error rate and the sum of weights separately, then
updates the weights of the local samples by collaborating
with other data owners. Overall, line 6-21 completes a single
round of the boosting algorithm, and line 23 outputs the
final meta-classifier after such m rounds. To compute the
weighted error rates and sum of weights securely, data own-
ers corroboratively run a secure sum computation protocol,
like Shamir secret sharing [25], [26] in line 11,12 and 18.
Similar MPC procedure has also been adopted in literature
[27]. In our paper, the reason to adopt MPC here is that
the error rates and weights are aggregated statistics of the
samples held by each data owner and they should be kept
secret to minimize the potential information leakage, while
such statistics are independent to the value of the individual
sample and they are not necessarily be perturbed. Next, we
give an example of computing the sum of weights, data
owner 1 adds a random number g1 to
∑N1
i=1 w
1
i and sends
it to data owner 2. Data owner 2 adds a random number
g2 and
∑N2
i=1 w
2
i to the received value from data owner 1
and sends it to data owner 3. The process continues till
data owner L adds a random number gL and
∑NL
i=1 w
L
i to
received value from data owner L − 1 and sends it to data
owner 1. Data owner 1 subtracts g1 from the received value
from data owner L and sends back the result to data owner
2. Data owner 2 subtracts g2 and sends back the result to
data owner 3. Process continues till data owner L subtracts
gL. Finally, data owner L gets the total sum of weights and
distributes to all other data owners.
3.4 Local Share Perturbation
In the proposed algorithm, each data owner perturbs the lo-
cal share and then sends the perturbed share to the data user
to fit the base classifier. In our definition, data user should
not be able to infer any individual sample from the received
share. As mentioned previously, according to the definition
of LDP, by seeing a perturbed data instance, it can’t distin-
guish it from the true data instance with a high confidence
(controlled by the parameter ). Thus to protect the privacy
of the individual data instance, the randomization method
which satisfies -LDP is adopted. In the meanwhile, one
challenge is also raised as how the utility of the base
classifier be maintained by building upon the perturbed
data instances. To the best of our knowledge, the statistical
information of the perturbed dataset could be maintained
with an error bound [18], [29], which gives us a way to
build the base classifier. Be more specifically, the statistical
information (e.g., the estimated mean) of the perturbed local
shares are used to build the base classifier, thus the utility
of the classifier could be guaranteed. To achieve the goal,
we first introduce the method [28] that is used to perturb
the numerical attributes and show the error bound for the
mean estimation. For ease of explanation, the individual
sample held by a data owner, x ∈ Rd,x = [x1, x2, · · · , xd],
is assumed to be perturbed here.
Algorithm 3 Piecewise Mechanism for One-Dimensional
Numeric Data [28]
1: Input: tuple xi ∈ [−1, 1] and privacy parameter 
2: Output: tuple x′i ∈ [−∆,∆]
3: ∆← e/2+1
e/2−1
4: φleft(xi)← ∆+12 · xi − ∆−12
5: φright(xi)← φleft(xi) + ∆− 1
6: Sample v uniformly at random from [0, 1];
7: if v < e
/2
e/2+1
then
8: Sample x′i uniformly at random from
[φleft(xi), φright(xi)]
9: else
10: Sample x′i uniformly at random from [−∆, φleft(xi)]∪
[φright(xi),∆]
11: end if
12: return x′i
Alg. 3 takes a single numerical value xi ∈ [−1, 1]
as input and returns a perturbed value x′i ∈ [−∆,∆],
where it confines x′i to a relatively small domain (i.e.,
x′i ∈ [−∆,∆]) while it also allows x′i to be close to xi (i.e.,
5x′i ∈ [φleft(xi), φright(xi)]) with reasonably large probabil-
ity (i.e., e
/2
e/2+1
). For the mean estimation, with at least 1− β
probability, it can be shown that | 1n
∑n
i=1 x
′
i − 1n
∑n
i=1 xi| =
O(
√
log(1/β)

√
n
), which is an error bound with the incurred
noise and is asymptotically optimal [29]. In the case that
the input domain is not within the range [−1, 1], namely,
xi ∈ [−t, t], t > 0, the data owner computes x∗i = xit and
perturbs x∗i with Alg. 3, then the data owner releases x
∗′
i · t,
where x∗′i is the perturbed output of x
∗
i . The assumption that
t is public information is commonly used in the literature
[29].
Algorithm 4 Piecewise Mechanism for Multi-Dimensional
Numeric Data [28]
1: Input: tuple x ∈ [−1, 1]d and privacy parameter 
2: Output: tuple x′ ∈ [−d ·∆, d ·∆]d
3: x′ ←< 0, 0, . . . , 0 >
4: k ← max{1,min{d, b 2.5c}}
5: Sample k values uniformly without replacement from
{1, 2, . . . , d}
6: for each sampled attribute j do
7: x′j =
d
kAlg.3(xj ,

k )
8: end for
9: return x′
when x is a multi-dimensional vector, namely, d > 1,
Alg. 4 is adopted, which selects k attributes, k < d and
perturbs each with Alg. 3. The intuition behind Alg. 4 is
to reduce the amount of the noise in the estimated mean
of x, where k is the value that chosen to minimize the
worst-case noise variance. Comparing to the solution that
perturbing d attributes with Alg. 3, where each attribute is
evenly given a privacy budget of d and the total amount
of noise in the mean estimation is in O(d
√
logd

√
n
), which
is super-linear to d; it can be proven that, with Alg. 4,
E[maxj∈[1,d]| 1n
∑n
i=1 x
′
i,j − 1n
∑n
i=1 xi,j |] = O(
√
dlog(d/β)

√
n
)
with at least 1 − β probability, and it is still asymptotically
optimal, where the full proof is referred to the original work
[28].
3.4.1 Privacy Budget Consumption
With Alg.4, we now take a look back of our proposed
privacy-preserving boosting algorithm and analyze the pri-
vacy and utility trade-off. In Alg. 2, the final classifier is
a combination of m base classifiers with different voting
weights, which are built after m rounds of computation.
In the non-private scenario, the data owner is able to
participate in all m rounds computation. However, in the
LDP setting, the privacy budget is affected by the repeating
involvements of a data owner. More specifically, suppose
the local share released by the data owner in the i-th
round satisfies i-differential privacy. By the composition
property of Differential Privacy [30], if -DP is required to
be enforced for the data owner’s data, then it needs that∑m
i i ≤ . Considering that the data owner participates all
m rounds, it becomes i = /m. Then the amount of the
noise contributed by each data owner becomes O(m
√
dlogd
 ),
which linearly depends on m. Thus to reduce the injected
noise, following the suggestion in the existing studies [29],
[31], each data owner only participates in at most one round.
In particular, as line 9-10 of Alg. 2 shows, in each round,
the data user uniformly at random selects a group H of
data owners, and asks each of them to submit the perturbed
local share. Then the data user aggregates |H| perturbed
local shares in each round, which results the amount of the
noise in O(
√
dlogd

√
|H| ).
3.5 Building Base Classifier
After giving an overview of the privacy-preserving boosting
algorithm and the perturbation methods, we now turn to
the exact classifier that to be fit. For a long time, Boosting
Decision Tree (BDT) has been used to demonstrate the
effectiveness of boosting, while the idea is actually applied
to other types of classifiers. In the subsection, we give three
examples of classifiers that could be supported and discuss
how to build such classifiers with different types of local
shares. Each final classifier consists of m base classifiers
with different weights, and the procedure to build each base
classifier keeps the same but with adjusted sample weights.
3.5.1 Local Samples
A straightforward approach to build the base classifier is
to contribute the data samples directly by each data owner,
then the data user collects such input and build the classifier
at a centralized site. However, to protect the privacy, the
data samples should be perturbed before releasing. Due to
the noise injected to each data instance, only the statistical
information could be well estimated, such as frequency and
mean estimation, which makes only certain types of classi-
fiers could be supported. Nearest Centroid Classifier (NCC)
is one such classifier could be built upon the perturbed
data samples, where the observation is assigned with the
label of the class of training samples whose centroid is
nearest to that observation. For data owner l, x∗i = wi · xi
is the weighted sample, x∗′i is the perturbed output of
x∗i by Alg.4 and (x
∗′
i , yi) is submitted to the data user.
For the data user, the centroid of class Ck is computed as
µk =
1
|Ck|
∑
i∈Ck x
∗′
i . Given an observation xt, the distance
to each class centroid is computed and then the class label
of closet centroid, yˆt = argmink ||µk − xt||`, is assigned to
xt.
3.5.2 Local Classifier
Contributing the perturbed data samples is a straightfor-
ward way, but the supported classifiers are limited due
to that only the mean of the data samples could be well
estimated. As an alternative, each data owner could locally
compute an optimal classifier using their own samples. In-
stead of submitting the data samples, the individual classi-
fier is then perturbed and contributed to the data user. More
specifically, assuming the classifier is trained by optimizing
the loss function L(·) that maps a d-dimensional parameter
vector θ into a real number, where the parameter vector ˆθl
computed by data owner l is identified as:
ˆ
θl = argmin
θl
[
1
N l
(
N l∑
i=1
L(θl;wli · xil; yli)] (3)
6Similarly, ˆθl
′
is the perturbed output of ˆθl by Alg.4. Then
the data user collects L perturbed parameter vectors and
obtains the final parameter vector:
θˆ =
1
L
∑
l
ˆ
θl
′
(4)
It is not hard to see that submitting the local classifiers
is a superior solution comparing to submitting the training
samples, while the accuracy of the estimation is affected by
the number of collected samples. GivenL data owners, there
are L local classifiers and the estimated error of the aggre-
gation is bounded by O(
√
dlogd

√
L
). However, each data owner
may hold more than one training sample, assuming the total
amount of the samples is n, when n  L, the estimated
error will be far less than aggregation of L parameters.
3.5.3 Local Statistic
Another type of base classifiers is built by the statistic
information of the data samples. In this case, rather than
individual samples or the local classifiers, the data owner
computes the statistic of the data samples and submits to
the data user. BDT is one such classifier could be built in
this way, and we explain the fitting procedure here. BDT is
one type of Decision Tree (DT) classifier, which makes the
decision by examining a sequence of conditions and it is
represented as a tree from the root node to the leaf node.
The internal node of the tree represents a condition, and
the corresponding value in the observation decides which
branch to proceed, till the leaf nodes provides the final
decision. Thus building a DT from the root to the leaves
needs to pick the proper attribute for each internal node
and the process repeats till the tree stop growing. The best
attribute to split is determined by the impurity measure-
ment before and after split over that attribute. The impurity
measurements usually include information gain [32], Gini
index [33] and misclassification error [34], and the former
two are commonly used in the DT. Comparing to DT that
usually resulted in multiple levels, BDT takes advantage
of the decision stumps of one depth and the final classi-
fier makes the final decision by considering the weighted
votes of all stumps. And we choose the measurement of
misclassification error in this paper, as the previous study
[35] shows that the misclassification error fits well in the
distributed environment. To summarize, the base classifier
in BDT is the decision stump which has a binary branch
and to find the best attribute to be split on this stump,
we use the misclassification error as the criteria. Next, we
describe how to privately find the best attribute based on
the misclassification error and to build the decision stump.
For ease of illustration, assumingAj is a binary attribute,
and there are two classes in the learning examples, the cross
table of Aj is a statistical summary and is represented as
Sj =
(sj0,0 sj0,1
sj1,0 s
j
1,1
)
, where sj0,1 denotes the weighted number
of examples with Aj = 0 and Class = 1. In short, for
all samples with Aj = 0 and belong to Class 1, instead
of adding the counts, sj0,1 is the added weights of the
corresponding samples. The misclassification error impurity
of the Aj = 0 is defined as 1 − max{sj0,0, sj0,1}/sj0, where
sj0 is the weighted number of samples that A
j = 0. Then
it can be shown that for each attribute, maximizing its gain
is equivalent to minimizing the weighted sum of impurities
[35]:
argmin
j
{ sj0
|Sj |
[
1− max{s
j
0,0, s
j
0,1}
sj0
]
+
sj1
|Sj |
[
1− max{s
j
1,0, s
j
1,1}
sj1
]}
⇐⇒ argmax
j
{|sj0,0 − sj0,1|+ |sj1,0 − sj1,1|} (5)
Thus the best attribute Abest is the one that has the min-
imum classification error, namely, |sbest0,0 − sbest0,1 | + |sbest1,0 −
sbest1,1 | ≥ |sj0,0−sj0,1|+ |sj1,0−sj1,1|,∀Aj 6= Abest. In our prob-
lem, the data user aggregates the cross tables of all attributes
from the data owners and to determine the best attribute.
More specifically, each data owner prepares two values
for each attribute, {sj0,0 − sj0,1, sj1,0 − sj1,1}, j = 1, 2, · · · , d
and submits the perturbed values to the data user, e.g.,
{(sj0,0 − sj0,1)′, (sj1,0 − sj1,1)′}. Upon receiving the statistics
from L data owners, the data user sums up the values
and computes {|∑l[(sj0,0−sj0,1)′]|, |∑l[(sj1,0−sj1,1)′]|}. Fur-
thermore, since it is only required to decide the attribute
that has minimum classification error, and the actual error
of each attribute is not necessarily needed. Thus the data
user could use the mean estimation to determine the best
attributes, namely, {|
∑
l[(s
j
0,0−sj0,1)′]
l |, |
∑
l[(s
j
1,0−sj1,1)′]
l |}. Thus
the data user determines the best attributes which has the
minimum classification error and broadcasts such attribute
to all data owners. Knowing the best attribute, each data
owner reports the majority of class labels for each branch
to the data user (recall it is a binary attribute), thus the
base classifier is determined by the best attribute and the
majorities class labels for each branch.
4 EXPERIMENT
In this section, we evaluate the proposed privacy-preserving
boosting algorithm through three types of classifiers, Lo-
gistic Regression (LR), Nearest Centroid Classifier (NCC),
Boosted Decision Tree (BDT); each classifier corresponds
to one subsection of Section 3.5. The utility of the learned
classifiers are assessed in terms of the prediction capacity
over three public datasets, the MNIST, Fashion-MNIST1,
and IPUMS dataset. The description of the datasets are
given below,
The MNIST dataset contains 28 × 28 grayscale images
of handwritten digits from 0 to 9, which has 60,000 samples
for training and 10,000 samples for testing.
The Fashion-MNIST dataset contains the grayscale ar-
ticle images that each sample associates with a label from
10 classes. The dataset is intended to replace the overused
MNIST dataset, and shares the same image size and struc-
ture of training and testing splits as the MNIST dataset.
The Brazil dataset contains census records of Brazil
between 1970 and 2010 that from the Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series [36] (IPUMS). The dataset has 12M
records and 10 attributes, 2 of them are numerical (e.g., age
and totalIncome) and the rest of them are categorical. In
1. https://github.com/zalandoresearch/fashion-mnist
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Fig. 2: LR classification accuracy v.s. privacy budgets. Each subfigure shows the result for one dataset in terms of Laplace,
Duchi and PM perturbation methods respectively. For MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, the dimensionality of the datasets is
50, and there are 500 data owners. For Brazil, the dimensionality of the dataset is 67, and there are 105 data owners.
TABLE 2: MSE of the mean estimation of the collected parameters of LR classifier in terms of Laplace, Duchi and PM
respectively.
Perturbation
 1.0 3.0 5.0 7.0 9.0
MNIST
Laplace 27.4852 + 0.7686 2.9896 + 0.1591 1.0848 + 0.0801 0.5387 + 0.0302 0.3333 + 0.0148
Duchi 0.6149 + 0.0367 0.1566 + 0.0100 0.1300 + 0.0073 0.1347 + 0.0086 0.1350 + 0.0075
PM 0.5104 + 0.0417 0.0381 + 0.0032 0.0299 + 0.0021 0.0139 + 0.0007 0.0129 + 0.0013
Fashion-MNIST
Laplace 26.6123 + 0.8602 3.1190 + 0.1216 1.0818 + 0.0787 0.5538 + 0.0332 0.3353 + 0.0130
Duchi 0.6189 + 0.0203 0.1614 + 0.0077 0.1334 + 0.0126 0.1389 + 0.0066 0.1344 + 0.0099
PM 0.4861 + 0.0235 0.0361 + 0.0023 0.0280 + 0.0014 0.0134 + 0.0015 0.0120 + 0.0006
Brazil
Laplace 11.9691 + 1.3442 1.2872 + 0.1661 0.5361 + 0.0904 0.2347 + 0.0295 0.1658 + 0.0286
Duchi 0.1616 + 0.0227 0.0436 + 0.0070 0.0377 + 0.0075 0.0400 + 0.0059 0.0372 + 0.0027
PM 0.2050 + 0.0200 0.0100 + 0.0021 0.0105 + 0.0024 0.0034 + 0.0012 0.0043 + 0.0006
the experiment, the totalIncome is used as the dependent
variable and is converted to binary attribute by mapping the
value larger than mean value to 1, and 0 otherwise [28]. The
categorical attributes with k distinct values are transformed
to k binary attributes as well. After the transformation, the
dimensionality of the dataset becomes 67.
For better representation, the MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST dataset are preprocessed with the Histogram of
Oriented Gradients (HOG) descriptors, where the descrip-
tor provides the histograms of directions of gradients that
are used to capture the edges and corners of an image,
which results in a fixed length of floating vector. Then a
Bag of Visual Words (BOVW) model is further associated
with the HOG descriptors, where the K-Means clustering is
performed over the generated descriptors and the center of
each cluster is used as the visual dictionarys vocabularies.
Finally, the frequency histogram is made from the visual
vocabularies and results in a fixed length of vector. By this
way, it is flexible to tune the number of visual vocabular-
ies of both datasets and provides the representation with
various dimensionalities.
For a comprehensive study, we further compare to two
other existing numerical attributes perturbation method,
Laplace mechanism [37] and Duchi et al.’s mechanism. The
Laplace mechanism perturbs the single numerical value by
adding a random noise Lap(0, 2/), in which Lap(µ, λ)
follows a Laplace distribution that has 0 mean and scale λ.
And it can be seen that the estimated mean of n perturbed
values is unbiased and the error is in 1

√
n
. However, to
perturb multiple attributes, each attribute evenly split the
total budget , which is assigned /d individually and the
error of the estimated mean of the multi-dimensional vector
is super-linear to d, which will be excessive given a large
d. Duchi et al.’s solution to perturb multiple numerical
attributes [29] is also asymptotically optimal, but has a
larger constant than Alg. 4, and the effect in terms of the
prediction capacity is demonstrated in the experiments. For
consistency, in the figures of this section, Laplace is referred
to the Laplace mechanism, Duchi is referred to the Duchi et
al.’s mechanism and PM is referred to Alg. 4.
4.1 Logistic Regression
We first present the evaluation result regarding LR im-
plementation. In the experiment, the dataset is randomly
shuffled and evenly split into L trunks to simulate L data
owners. Then a local LR classifier is built with each trunk
of data and the parameter of the local classifier is perturbed
by Alg. 4 to satisfy -LDP. The base classifier is attained by
taking the mean value of a group of the perturbed classifiers
and the prediction capacity is evaluated. Fig. 2 displays the
LR accuracy for all three datasets. Each subfigure compares
three perturbation methods, the horizontal axis specifies
privacy budget , and the vertical axis shows the classifi-
cation accuracy. From the figure, for all three perturbation
methods, it can be seen that the accuracy improves as 
increases in general, as the incurred noise decreases, and PM
among all three perturbation methods achieves the highest
accuracy. The reason is that PM has the smallest error in
the aggregation of the classifier parameters, and Table. 2
presents the corresponding MSE of the estimated mean of
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Fig. 3: NCC classification accuracy v.s. privacy budgets. For MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, the dimensionality of the datasets
is 50, and there are 10,000 samples collected in total. For Brazil, the dimensionality of the dataset is 67, and there are 106
samples collected in total.
the parameters. Comparing to Laplace and Duchi, PM has
the smallest MSE across all privacy budgets except one
setting, and the magnitude of the MSE difference reflects the
pattern in Fig. 2. For instance, for the MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST datasets, the MSE of PM is one order of magnitude
smaller than Duchi, and two order of magnitude smaller
than Laplace, which shows the good utility of the learned
base classifier.
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Regarding the number of data owners, recall the to-
tal noise incurred in the mean estimation by PM is in
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Fig. 6: MNIST NCC classification accuracy & MSE v.s. num-
ber of samples, =3.0, #.dim=100
O(d
√
logd

√
n
), where n is the number of samples. While ag-
gregating the local classifiers from L data owners, the noise
is in O(d
√
logd

√
L
), since each data owner contributes one
vector of parameters to represent the local classifier. And
the error becomes less as more data owners involve in the
aggregation. To illustrate the point, we fix the amount of
the privacy budget and varies the number of data owners
to see the effect. Fig. 4 shows the result of the MNIST
dataset and Fig. 5 shows the result of the Brazil dataset.
In each figure, the horizontal axis specifies the number of
data owners, the left vertical axis shows the classification
accuracy and the right vertical axis provides the MSE of
the mean of the parameter vectors of the classifiers. From
Fig. 2, it concludes that Laplace performs worse than the
other two perturbation methods, thus in the figures here we
only display the comparison between PM and Duchi. From
the MNIST dataset, it can be seen that PM always has less
noise than Duchi, and the classifiers of former consistently
achieve higher accuracy than the latter. From the Brazil
dataset, it can be observed that both PM and Duchi achieves
similar loss when the number of data owners grows over
10,000. And the experiment results agree with the theoretical
analysis. To summarize, the MSE has a substantial drop
from hundreds of data owners to tens of thousands of data
owners, while classification accuracy improves with a small
magnitude. The reason might be the incurred noise has a
small influence to the magnitude of the coefficients of LR,
which implies the coefficients of LR has a larger tolerance
range to errors.
The experiments above demonstrate the utility of the
base classifier in one round of Alg. 2, and we didn’t observe
accuracy improvements by boosting multiple LR classifiers,
the reason might due to the linearity of the model.
4.2 Nearest Centroid Classifier
In this subsection, we present the evaluation result of the
NCC. Instead of contributing one vector from each data
owner, for NCC, each data owner perturbs each individual
data sample and submits all perturbed samples he held. The
final classifier is learned by finding the centroid of each class
after all perturbed samples have been collected. Fig. 3 shows
the experiment result regarding three perturbation methods.
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Fig. 7: Boosted NCC misclassification rate v.s. number of base learners. For MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, the dimensionality
of the datasets is 100, and each base learner is fitted by 10,000 perturbed samples. For Brazil, the dimensionality of the
dataset is 67, and each base learner is fitted by 105 perturbed samples.
And it can be seen that PM performs better than other two
perturbation methods for NCC, however, the performance
gap between PM and Duchi is larger than the LR, which
implies that the parameters of NCC are more sensitive than
LR since the decision boundary of NCC is determined by the
Euclidean distance between the samples and the centroid,
thus the magnitude of the noise has a bigger impact to the
prediction capacity. For the Brazil dataset, it can be seen that
with the large enough samples sizes (millions), the utility
of the learned NCC is well preserved for even with a low
privacy budget (1.0).
Fig. 6 presents the classification result regarding various
number of collected samples, ranges from 1000 to 9000.
Comparing to LR, the impact of the resulted error in the pa-
rameters is more significant, the reason is explained above.
Finally, we boost the NCC classifier with Alg. 2 and the
result is depicted in Fig. 7. Each subfigure shows the result
for one dataset, and boosting the NCC leads a 3% − 4%
accuracy gain when no noise is injected in general, which
proves the effectiveness of the boosting algorithm. Due to
the sample size, the number of base classifiers is limit under
10, as each data owner only contribute once during boost-
ing. The figure also plots the accuracy under two privacy
budgets, 3.0 and 5.0, and it can be seen that even though the
injected noise hurts the utility of the learned base classifier
in each round, as the misclassification rate is high compared
to the noise-free result, the boosted NCC still gets lower
misclassification rate than non-boosted NCC (the first round
of boosting), which shows the effectiveness of the proposed
algorithm.
4.3 Boosted Decision Tree
We present the experiment result of the BDT classifier in
this subsection, the evaluation is performed over the MNIST
and a synthetic dataset. From the MNIST dataset, we picked
the confusable digit 4 and 9 for the classification; For the
synthetic dataset, there are two classes and twenty attributes
generated, ten of them are the meaningful attributes, the
rest of them are generated as non-informative features that
are the linear combination of the ten meaningful ones. And
there are 106 synthetic samples generated. Both datasets
have a balanced number of positive and negative samples.
In the experiment, the cross tables of all attributes from each
trunk are computed and perturbed, then the cross tables
from all trunks are aggregated and the best attribute is
decided by the calculated minimum misclassification error.
Thus a decision stump is built over the best attribute in each
round. Due to the injected noise, the computed attribute
from the perturbed cross tables might not be true best
attribute. Thus we first investigate the top-k hitting rate
of the computed best attribute. Given the non-perturbed
cross tables of all attributes, the attributes are sorted based
on the misclassification error in an ascendant order. The
top-k hitting rate is the probability that the computed best
attribute from the perturbed cross tables appears in the
top-k non-perturbed best attributes. The larger k is, the
higher hitting rate is. When k is equal to the number of
the total attributes, the hitting rate reaches the 100%. In the
experiment, the probability is computed over 100 runs.
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Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 depict the top-1 and top-3 hitting rates
regarding various privacy budgets for the MNIST binary
and synthetic dataset. For a comparison, both Duchi and
PM perturbation methods are evaluated, and the result
are computed for building one decision stump. For both
datasets, the top-k hitting rates increase as  increases, which
implies less noise injected and the estimated error become
less. For the binary MNIST dataset, the top-3 hitting rates
of PM perturbation reaches almost 80% as  grows to 5.0,
which implies that the probability is around 80% that the
computed best attributes from the perturbed cross table is
one of the top-3 true best attributes; while the top-1 hitting
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rate is around 40%. The reason is that there are 1,000 data
owners simulated in the experiment, and the resulted error
is larger than the classification error difference among the
top-3 best attributes. Similarly, Fig. 9 shows the result that
there are 10,000 data owners simulated from the synthetic
dataset, and the top-3 hitting rate is almost 100% as 
reaches to 3.0. For the classification accuracy, Fig. 10 and 11
plots the misclassification rate as a function of the number of
decision stumps in the classifier. For a comparison, the non-
private BDT is also depicted in the figure, and it confirms
the effectiveness of the boosting algorithm. For the BDT
classifier built from the perturbed data, it can be seen that
the it has a similar prediction capacity compared to the non-
private one under various number of decision stumps. The
result confirms that the privacy-preserving BDT successfully
maintains a similar utility gain as the non-private one.
5 RELATED WORK
Local Differential Privacy (LDP) is firstly proposed by [17],
in which it is proposed to eliminate the trusted curator and
allow the data owner to control the information releasing
in a private manner. Collecting the statistical information is
one of great interests in the community, and a randomized
response mechanism [21] was invented decades ago to be
used in public domain survey. Recently, Wang et al. propose
a framework [18] that generalizes several LDP protocols in
the literature and analyzes each one regarding the task of
frequency estimation. Bassily and Smith [38] develops an
asymptotically optimal solution for the succinct histogram
building over the categorical domain under LDP. And for
the discrete inputs, Kairouz et al. [22] study the trade-off
between the utility and LDP in terms of family of extremal
mechanisms. Two simple extremal mechanisms, the binary
and randomized response mechanisms, are proposed and
shown the theoretical guarantee of the utility. For the real-
world application, RAPPOR [39] is the first that practically
adopts LDP to collect the statistics from the end users, which
is designed by Google. Apple and Microsoft also propose
their own tools to use LDP in collecting usage, typing
history [40] and telemetry data [41]. Lately, a Encode, Shuffle,
Analysis (ESA) system architecture [42] is proposed to sup-
port a wide range of analysis tasks privately and is used in
the software monitoring implementation. All above works
focus on the applications based on frequency estimation,
where the underlying data are more likely categorical or
discrete, while our problem focuses on the numerical data.
Under LDP, several data mining and machine learning
problems have been studied, such as probability distribu-
tion estimation [43], [44], [45], [46], frequent itemset mining
[47], Bayes learning [48] and clustering [49]. Furthermore,
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) that satisfying -LDP
have been used in many applications. Wang et al. [28]
proposes an piecewise mechanism for multi-dimension nu-
merical attributes perturbation and demonstrate its usage
in empirical risk minimization In the paper, the authors
demonstrate the computation with three machine learning
models, the linear regression, logistic regression and SVM,
where multiple data owners locally compute and perturb
the gradients of the parameters, then shares the noisy ver-
sion to the aggregator. Another client-server machine learn-
ing framework is proposed to learn the Generalized Linear
models [20], where the server simultaneous delivers the
models to the distributed clients and asks for the parameter
update. More specifically, the server maintains k versions of
the machine learning model, and randomly selects one ver-
sion to update the parameters and replaces another version.
To enforce the -LDP, the client uses Laplace mechanism to
perturb the parameters and returns the model to the server.
Zhang et al. [50] consider the problem of multiparty deep
learning, wherein multiple data owners train a local deep
neural network model and then privately share the model
for aggregation, the -LDP is enforced by the Laplace mech-
anism before each data owner share the local gradients. The
difference between our work and these works is the machine
learning model, we are interested in the privacy protection
during the boosting procedure and the type of classifiers
that could be supported under the privacy-aware manner,
for example, the BDT classifier, which is built by aggregating
the statistical information and is hardly built through the
SGD approach.
Privacy-preserving model sharing and aggregation has
been studied in several literature. Pathak et al. [27] pro-
pose a protocol of composing a differentially private global
classifier (e.g., Logistic Regression classifier) by aggregating
the classifiers locally trained at the data owner. To protect
each individual data sample, the secure protocol utilizes
secure multi-party computation (SMC) to aggregate the
local classifiers and the global classifier is then perturbed
to satisfy the -DP. Decision tree induction in the distributed
setting has been studied in many applications, Caragea et
al. [51] formulates the problem of learning from distributed
data and proposes a generate strategy to transform the
machine learning algorithm into distributed setting. As an
example, for the decision tree induction, the local statistics
are collected at the centralized site and then the best split-
ting attribute is decided by maximizing the gain from the
aggregated statistics. Another work by Bar-Or et al. [52]
optimizes the communication overhead of the exchanging
statistics by filtering out the attributes based on the bounds
of the information gain and develops a distributed hierar-
chical decision tree algorithm. Bhaduri et al. [35] develops
a scalable distribute algorithm for decision tree induction in
the peer-to-peer environment, which works in a completely
asynchronous manner and has a low communication over-
head. Comparing to regular decision tree, Boosted Decision
Tree (BDT) limits the depth of the tree to one and shares the
same strategy to split the node. Gambs et al. [53] introduces
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the privacy-preserving boosting algorithm based on MPC,
but the algorithm doesn’t consider the information disclo-
sure of individual learning example, thus the technique
(e.g., without adding noise for differential privacy) gives
inadequate privacy protection, in contrast, our privacy-
preserving boosting algorithm provides a stronger solution
that prevents the information leakage.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving boosting
algorithm, and there are two types of parties in our scenario,
a data user intends to run the boosting algorithm and learn
a classifier and multiple data owners that are willing to
contribute the data for the learning purpose but the with
privacy protection. The proposed algorithm guarantees that
the data user cannot learn the individual training sample
from the data owner. The assurance is achieved by the Local
Differentially Private (LDP) mechanism, where each data
owner perturbs their local data share and then contributes
the perturbed data to the data user. Due to the noise injected
at individual training sample, only the statistic information
of the aggregated data could be well preserved, e.g., mean
estimations. With the proposed boosting algorithm, we im-
plement the BDT classifier by utilizing the statistical infor-
mation from the perturbed data and analyze the privacy and
utility trade-off. Furthermore, we also study two other types
of classifiers that could be supported and the corresponding
data shares to be adopted, e.g., Nearest Centroid Classifier
and Logistic Regression. In the experiment, we investigate
the utility of the learned classifiers in terms of the classifi-
cation capacity through multiple real datasets, and compare
to two existing perturbation methods, the result shows that
the learned classifiers by our method effectively maintain a
superior utility.
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